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Abstract
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we make two contribu-
tions to the literature on end-of-life transfers. First, we show that unequal bequests
are much more common than generally recognized, with one-third of parents with
wills planning to divide their estates unequally among their children. These plans
for unequal division are particularly concentrated in complex families, that is, fam-
ilies with stepchildren and families with genetic children with whom the parent has
had no contact (e.g., children from previous marriages). We find that in complex
families past and current contact between parents and children reduces or eliminates
unequal bequests. Second, although the literature focuses on the bequest intentions
of parents who have made wills, we find that many elderly Americans have not made
wills. Although the probability of having a will increases with age, 30 percent of
HRS respondents aged 70 and over have no wills. Of HRS respondents who died
between 1995 and 2010, 38 percent died intestate (i.e., without wills). Thus, focus-
ing exclusively on the bequest intentions of parents who have made wills provides
an incomplete and misleading picture of end-of-life transfers.
JEL Classification: D13, J12, K36
Keywords: Bequests, intergenerational transfers, altruism, exchange, evolutionary
motives, family structure
∗We are grateful to Sonia Bhalotra and seminar participants at the University of Geneva, UCLA,
the 2014 RES Conference, 2014 ESPE Conference, 2014 EEA Conference and 2014 EALE Conference
for comments and suggestions. The text refers to supplementary online material, which is available at
<https://sites.google.com/site/domtabasso/appendix-material-for-unequal-bequests>.
1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate bequest behavior using a large and nationally representative
US sample drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) over the period 1995–
2010. A distinguishing feature of our work is its focus on complex families, in particular on
parents with stepchildren and parents with genetic children with whom they have limited
or no contact (e.g., children from previous marriages). We complement our analysis of
the bequest intentions of parents with wills by examining actual bequests using reports
about the disposition of the estates of HRS respondents who died between one HRS
wave and the next. We find that unequal bequests (both intended and actual) are much
more prevalent than previously documented, with one-third of parents with wills planning
to distribute their estates unequally. Unequal intended bequests are most common in
complex families, but contact between parents and children reduces or eliminates unequal
bequests. Finally, we find that a substantial fraction of elderly parents report having no
wills and a substantial fraction of HRS respondents who died had no wills.
Empirical research has long established that a substantial majority of parents intend to
divide their estates equally among their children (Menchik 1980; Wilhelm 1996; McGarry
1999; Cox 2003; Light and McGarry 2004; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004). Despite the
fact that earlier economic models predicted unequal bequests (e.g., Becker 1974; Bern-
heim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985; Cox 1987), more recent studies have developed theories
that attempt to rationalize the prevalence of equal bequests, sometimes also attempting
to explain why parents treat their children unequally with respect to inter vivos transfers
but equally with respect to bequests (e.g., Andreoni 1989; Bernheim and Severinov 2003).
The proportion of American parents aged 50 and over who reported having wills,1 in
which their children were treated unequally more than doubled between 1995 and 2010,
rising from 16 percent to almost 35 percent (Figure 1).2 This upward trend, which holds
for both mothers and fathers, is not simply driven by the ageing of the HRS respondents.3
1We focus on the bequest intentions of parents with wills because most of the information on bequest
intentions collected by HRS is from parents who report that they have wills. See the data description in
subsection 3.B.
2Throughout the paper, stepchildren are counted as “children”. Moreover, although the legal definition
of stepchildren is narrow (i.e., a stepchild is the child of a spouse), we use this term broadly, to include
the children of a cohabiting partner as well as the children of a legally married spouse.
3Between 1998 and 2010 the average age of the HRS sample increased only by four years. This is due
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A similar increase can be observed across several cohorts of Americans born since 1890
(Figure 2). In fact, younger cohorts (i.e., those born in 1960 or after) are more likely to
intend unequal bequests. The sharpest increases occurred among individuals who are no
longer married: widows, widowers, and divorced individuals (Figure 3).4
Since the middle of the 1990s the fraction of parents reporting unequal bequest inten-
tions has consistently been 30 percentage points higher among parents with stepchildren
than among those with biological children only (Figure 4). Comparing parents who have
had no contact with at least one of their genetic children with those who have had at
least some contact with all of their genetic children, we find the no-contact parents about
25 percentage points less likely to intend equal bequests.5 The trends in unequal bequest
intentions among parents without contact with their children is the same as the trend
observed among parents with stepchildren. Our data indicate that as the proportion of
stepparents has risen considerably in the last twenty years, so has the fraction of parents
who plan unequal bequests.
When individuals die without a valid will, the intestacy laws of their state provide
the default allocation, dividing the decedent’s estate between the surviving spouse and
the children.6 After providing a substantial share for the surviving spouse, intestacy
laws divide the remainder equally among the decedent’s biological and legally adopted
children. Unlike surviving spouses, under intestacy laws surviving cohabiting partners
inherit nothing. And, unlike biological and legally adopted children, under intestacy laws
stepchildren inherit nothing (Fried 1992; Brashier 2004).
Since 1998 the average fraction of HRS respondents without a will has been around 42
percent (Figure 5).7 Among respondents with stepchildren the average fraction without
wills is somewhat greater (49 percent), and it is even greater among parents who have
to a number of reasons, including attrition, death of older respondents and, since 2004, the introduction
of new cohorts of individuals aged 51 to 56.
4HRS data do not allow us to distinguish between cohabitors and married individuals.
5In 1995 the HRS did not ask the question on parent-child contact, while in 2010 the question was
asked only to a small fraction of respondents. These are the reasons why in Figure 4 those two years are
not shown.
6As Rosenbury (2005) shows, there are important differences in intestacy laws across states, but we
focus on features that are common across states.
7This figure starts in 1998 because the 1995 HRS wave oversampled older people (with an average age
of 78 years), while the 1996 wave oversampled younger individuals, whose average age is 59 years. From
1998 onwards, the study comprised both subsamples, and in that year individuals were on average aged
67.
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no contact with their genetic children (58 percent). Parents aged less than 70 are much
less likely to have wills, perhaps because writing a will is not yet salient for them, but a
staggering 30 percent of parents aged 70 and over report not having wills.
Standard economic models ignore complex families. The (usually implicit) assumption
is that all children are born to a married couple who remain married to each other. When
one spouse dies, the surviving spouse is (usually implicitly) assumed not to remarry.
Little is said about divorce, remarriage or repartnering and even less about multiple
partner fertility.8 By ignoring divorce, repartnering, or remarriage, canonical economic
models fail to recognize the increased complexity of the family (Bumpass and Lu 2000;
Stevenson and Wolfers 2007; Lundberg and Pollak 2014).
In addition to presenting a representative picture of contemporary end-of-life transfers,
we make two contributions to the literature. First, we show that unequal bequests are
much more common than generally recognized. Unequal bequests are concentrated in
complex families, that is, families in which parents have stepchildren and families with
genetic children with whom the parent has had no contact (e.g., children from previous
marriages). Parents with stepchildren are much less likely to include all children in their
wills than parents without stepchildren, and parents with stepchildren who have wills
are substantially less likely to plan equal bequests. Similarly, parents who have had no
contact with one or more of their genetic children are less likely to include all of their
children in their wills. When all children are included in the parent’s will, we find that
parents with no-contact children are less likely to plan equal bequests. The likelihood of
unequal bequests, however, is reduced and often entirely eliminated by longer coresidence
of stepparents and stepchildren. We interpret this finding as reflecting the accumulation
of family-specific capital (e.g., trust and affection) that triggers norms of equal treatment.
Our second contribution to the literature on end-of-life transfers shifts the focus from
individuals with wills to those who die intestate (i.e., without wills). We find that many
elderly Americans do not have wills. More specifically, 40 percent of HRS respondents
report not having wills and 30 percent of HRS respondents aged 70 and over report not
having wills. Of HRS respondents who died, 38 percent died intestate. Hence, the usual
8In a traditional nuclear family all the children in the household are joint children, but one or both
spouses may have children from previous partnerships living elsewhere.
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focus on bequest intentions provides an incomplete and misleading picture of end-of-life
transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on bequests and
describes the legal environment in which individuals make end-of-life transfers. The data
are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis of
bequest intentions and of the actual division of estates. Section 5 provides a simple
conceptual framework for interpreting end-of-life transfers. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background and Related Literature
Almost all economic models predict unequal bequests.9 For example, the altruist model
assumes that parents equalize marginal utilities across children (Barro 1974; Becker 1974;
Becker and Tomes 1979; Tomes 1981). This assumption, together with some strong
assumptions about preferences and inter vivos transfers, implies that parents will bequeath
more to their less well-off children. Exchange models assume that bequests are made
to children in return for their services such as attention and care (Bernheim, Shleifer,
and Summers 1985; Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992). Because children face different
opportunity costs of providing these services, exchange models predict that children will
provide different amounts of services and will receive unequal bequests.10
Although both the altruist model and exchange models have some empirical support
(Tomes 1988, Cox and Rank 1992; Laitner and Ohlsson 2001), most empirical studies
challenge both classes of models finding that an overwhelming majority of parents divide
their estates equally among their children (Menchik 1980, 1988; Wilhelm 1996; McGarry
1999; Light and McGarry 2004; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004).11 Significant effort has
then been devoted to rationalizing equal bequests. For instance, Bernheim and Severinov
(2003) propose a model of intergenerational transfers based on the assumption that each
9Comprehensive reviews of the extensive economics literature on bequests are given by Behrman
(1997), Laitner (1997), Laferre`re and Wolff (2006), and McGarry (2008, 2013). For an introduction
to the legal literature, see Friedman (2009) and Grossman and Friedman (2011). For a comprehensive
treatment of the legal issues, see Dukeminier and Sitkoff (2013).
10Bargaining power and bargaining ability will also play a role in the absence of special assumptions
(e.g., the ability of parents to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to their children.)
11Wilhelm (1996) which use federal estate tax data, does allow for adopted children but not for stepchil-
dren and assumes that parents have equal (symmetric) concern for all their children. To the best of our
knowledge, all bequest models driven by altruism or exchange motives ignore stepchildren.
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child’s perception of parental affection influences his or her subjective well-being. Children
cannot directly observe parental preferences, but parents signal affection through their
actions, including bequests. Altruistic parents then must consider the possibility that
unequal bequests may lead their children to infer that they are loved either more or less
than their siblings. The assumption that the division of inter vivos gifts is not observed
by all the children, whereas the division of bequests (or the division implied by bequest
intentions) is, remains untested. Nor is it clear whether and how parents’ stated bequest
intentions affect children’s actions (e.g., caregiving) regarding the parents. Equal division
is also consistent with parents’ indifference over how their estates are divided among their
children. But indifference is both implausible and theoretically unsatisfying because it is
compatible with all possible division patterns.12
Evolutionary psychology suggests a suite of hypotheses about end-of-life transfers that
are still largely untested (Cox 2003, 2007). The underlying premise is that parents behave
so as to maximize the probability of survival of their genes and that children with greater
wealth are more likely to pass on their genes. One implication is what we call the “genetic-
child hypothesis” — that is, parents will make end-of-life transfers to their genetic children
rather than to their social children (i.e., genetically unrelated children such as stepchildren
who live in the same household).13 We consider the implications of this hypothesis in two
cases: stepchildren and genetic children with whom the decedent has had no contact (e.g.,
children from a previous marriage who were very young when the parents divorced). The
genetic child hypothesis makes clear predictions in both of these cases. Decedents will
favor their genetic children.14
12Pollak (1988) argues that the credibility of the parents’ threat to disinherit a child in the strategic
bequest model of Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) crucially depends on the assumption that
parents are indifferent over how their estates are divided among their children.
13Unlike models based on altruism or exchange, which hinge on actions taken individually by parents
and children (such as the child’s need for support or the frequency of visits to and other contacts with
elderly parents), the genetic-child hypothesis relies on one specific trait – the genetic link between dece-
dents and potential beneficiaries. In this respect, the genetic-child hypothesis is similar to models of
intrahousehold allocation that emphasize a single (exogenous) attribute, such as birth order (Behrman
and Taubman 1986; Chu 1991) or the child’s sex (Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 1986). Although these
other single-attribute models may be useful for understanding differential inter vivos transfers or bequests
related to birth order or sex, they cannot explain unequal bequests or bequest intentions toward genetic
and social children.
14Evolutionary reasoning also speaks to the distribution of bequests among biological children and,
when it does, it seldom predicts equal bequests. For example, a childless post-menopausal daughter
would not be predicted to receive bequests. These accounts however are outside the scope of our paper.
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The only empirical work that attempts to assess the relative importance of the al-
truism, exchange, and the genetic-child hypotheses is Light and McGarry (2004). Using
intended bequest data for a sample of 45- to 80-year-old mothers drawn from the Na-
tional Longitudinal Surveys of Young Women and Mature Women, they find that the
vast majority of mothers (more than 92 percent) intend to leave equal bequests. The
mothers who said they intended to leave unequal bequests were asked to explain why.
Some responded with explanations that were consistent with altruism, others with ex-
change and, among mothers with stepchildren, some with explanations consistent with
the genetic-child hypothesis. Light and McGarry find that greater within-family variation
in children’s incomes (a proxy for altruism), poor maternal health (a proxy for exchange),
and the presence of stepchildren (a proxy for the genetic-child motive) are associated with
higher probabilities of unequal intended bequests. More specifically, for mothers with at
least one genetic child and at least one stepchild, they find that the probability of unequal
intended bequests increases from 7.9 to 11.3 percent, a 43 percent increase.
Other studies examine the extent to which the division of end-of-life transfers com-
pensates for caregiving. For example, using data from the first wave of the Assets and
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old, Brown (2006) finds that children who are cur-
rently caregivers are 32 percentage points more likely than their noncaregiving siblings
to be included in their parents’ life insurance policies, while expected caregivers are three
percentage points more likely to be included in their parents’ wills and 15 percentage
points more likely to be included in their parents’ life-insurance policies.
Unequal transfers from parents to children and from children to parents have also been
documented in divorced families. Analyzing the effects of parental marital disruption on
late-life inter vivos transfers, Pezzin and Schone (1999) find that parents (especially elderly
men) engage in substantially lower levels of transfers with stepchildren than with their
genetic children. Marital disruption is also central in Pezzin, Pollak, and Schone (2008).
That study, however, concentrates on “upstream transfers” (i.e., adult children’s time
and cash transfers to their unpartnered disabled elderly parents) rather than on “down-
stream transfers” (i.e., transfers of time and cash from parents to their children). They
find unequal flows of services to parents in families that experience divorce, with stepchil-
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dren providing significantly lower transfers than genetic children. Other than Light and
McGarry (2004), however, no previous study has examined bequests to stepchildren.
End-of-life transfers and bequests have also been analyzed by legal scholars and com-
mentators. Unequal division of estates among genetic children typically generates unease
among trust and estates lawyers because they view unequal bequests as invitations to
litigation (Collins 2000; Blattmachr 2008; American Bar Association 2013). Stepchildren,
however, belong to a different category since the law treats stepchildren as unrelated
strangers rather than as family members (Schanzenbach and Sitkoff 2009).
Legal scholars also write on intestacy, a subject thus far entirely neglected by economists.
Intestacy statutes divide the estates of married decedents with children between the sur-
viving spouse and the decedent’s genetic and legally adopted children.15 If a stepparent
dies without a valid will, stepchildren inherit nothing.16 As a number of scholars have
pointed out, stepchildren have never fared well under intestacy statutes (Mahoney 1989;
Gary 2000; Noble 2002; Brashier 2004; Cremer 2011). Stepchildren however may inherit
from their absent biological parent, and so it is unclear whether they are truly disadvan-
taged by intestacy law.17 This is an issue that cannot be explored with the HRS data and
requires additional research.
Some stepparents may intentionally forego writing a will precisely because they know
that intestacy laws will mandate an equal division among their biological and adopted
children and give nothing to their stepchildren. On the other hand, parents with genetic
children with whom they have had no contact might write wills to avoid giving these
children an equal share of their estates. Some parents are no doubt aware of the default
division imposed by intestacy law while others are not. Unfortunately, HRS provides
no information about respondents’ knowledge of or beliefs about intestacy law. We can
examine, however, for the first time, whether parents are less likely to write a will if they
15The Uniform Probate Code treats adopted children as if they were biological children of the decedent
(Noble 2002; Cahn 2005).
16California provides a narrow exception to this generalization: a stepchild may inherit if it can be
shown that the stepparent would have adopted the stepchild but was prevented from doing so by a legal
barrier. This exception is available only to a stepchild who satisfies the legal definition of a stepchild
(i.e., a child of the decedent’s spouse, not of the decedent’s cohabiting partner). See Hanson (1995) and
Noble (2002) for more details.
17At common law, in fact, the relationship of stepparent and stepchild generally confers no rights and
imposes no duties (Wypyski 1984).
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have stepchildren or if they have genetic children with whom they have had no contact.
3. Data
A. Samples
Our analysis uses data collected between 1995 and 2010 by the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), which contains detailed information about bequest intentions and the actual
distribution of estates.18 The HRS is a longitudinal survey of a nationally representative
sample of more than 26,000 Americans over the age of 50 who are interviewed every
two years.19 If a respondent has a spouse or partner, the spouse or partner is invited
to become an HRS respondent too. In each survey year, the “core files” provide data
from standard questionnaires administered to all respondents. The “exit files” provide
information about the actual distribution of the estates of HRS respondents who died
since the previous wave; this information is collected from a proxy respondent, such as
the surviving spouse, an adult child, or another close family member.
From the core files we select respondents with at least one child and with nonmissing
information on intended bequests and other basic variables. This leaves us with an unbal-
anced panel of 23,984 individuals, for a total of 117,189 person-wave observations. When
first observed in the study, 11,221 individuals (47 percent of the sample) report having
no will, while 12,763 report having a will. As the survey progresses, the percentage of
individuals without a will decreases to 42 percent. Of the 21,140 parents in our sample
with more than one child, 11,170 (53 percent) report their plans to distribute their estates
among their children. More than one fifth of the whole sample (5,082 parents) report hav-
ing both biological children and stepchildren.20 Of these individuals, 2,342 report having
a will (about 18 percent of the sample of parents with wills or over 46 percent of the
parents with stepchildren).
The HRS also collects information on the frequency of contacts between parents and
children. We use this information for the 12,739 individuals who have genetic children
18As noted in the Introduction, HRS asks respondents about their bequest intentions only if they report
having wills or trusts.
19See <http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/> for more information about the data.
20The HRS does not distinguish between genetic children and adopted children.
9
only. Just over 17 percent of them (2,178 parents) report having no contact in the previous
year with at least one of their children.21 Among no-contact parents, the proportion
without a will exceeds 57 percent. This is substantially greater than that observed among
parents who have more frequent contact with all their genetic children (42 percent).
The exit files provide information on the actual disposition of estates and other basic
variables for 7,416 individuals (almost 85 percent) of the 8,800 HRS respondents who
died over the sample period. There are 2,781 parents (38 percent) who died intestate, a
slightly smaller proportion than the 42 percent of HRS respondents in the core files who
report having no wills. Of the remaining 4,635 who died with a will, 3,897 had more than
one child and 630 (18 percent of the sample of decedents with wills and with more than
one child) had both stepchildren and genetic children, representing more than 90 percent
of decedents with stepchildren.22
B. Outcomes
Table 1 shows the means of our main dependent variables broken down by the presence
of stepchildren in both the core and the exit files and by parents’ marital status. About
42 percent of the sample in the core files does not have a will (column (a)). The raw
difference of 6.9 percentage points between those with stepchildren (column (b)) and
those with genetic children only (column (c)) is statistically significant. Almost two-
thirds of divorced parents do not have a will. Again, parents with stepchildren are less
likely to have a will than parents with genetic children only. The same picture emerges
from the exit files, even though the fraction of all parents without a will is almost 38
percent, somewhat less than in the core files. We shall return to this issue in the next
section.
As mentioned above and in the Introduction, we focus on parents with wills because
most of the information collected by HRS is from parents who report that they have a
21Among parents with both stepchildren and genetic children, the proportion of parents with no contact
with at least one of their biological children is higher, being around 20%. Since only 450 parents in our
sample belong to this category, however, a detailed analysis of their bequest intentions is not possible.
22The exit files yield a sample that is smaller than that obtained from the core files. Moreover, at
present, it disproportionally represents individuals with lower socioeconomic status and higher mortality
risks (Cutler et al. 2011).
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will.23 Conditional on having a will, about three-quarters of the parents from the core
files report they include all children in their wills, while only 59 percent of the estates
whose distributions are reported in the exit files were divided in a way that included all
children. Intended inclusion of all children is substantially less likely among parents with
stepchildren regardless of their marital status, but this does not emerge in the exit files,
where none of the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels (column
(d), panel B).
Finally, in the core files, almost one-third of all parents with a will report that they
plan to distribute their estate unequally among their children (column (a), panel C).
Intended unequal divisions are much more likely among parents with stepchildren (61
percent for all parents and a staggering 75 percent for divorced parents, column (b))
than among parents with genetic children only (27 and 29 percent respectively, column
(c)). In the exit files, however, the proportion of estates that are divided unequally is
substantially greater (53 percent). The difference between parents with stepchildren and
parents with genetic children only is smaller than that observed in the core files, but is
always statistically significant. This may reflect a change in parents’ behavior between
the time they reported their intentions in the core files and the actual distribution of their
estates reported in the exit files. It may also be driven by selection (parents in the exit
files are older) or reflect the difference in mortality rates by socioeconomic status (parents
in the exit files are less educated and less healthy, and these might be the type of parents
who are more likely to distribute unequally their end-of-life resources).
Appendix Table A1 mirrors Table 1 focusing on no-contact parents. As in the case of
parents with stepchildren, parents who have had no contact with their genetic children
in the past year are much less likely to have a will. About 57 percent of no-contact
parents have no will, as opposed to 42 percent of parents who have regular contact with
all their genetic children (panel A). Among divorced no-contact parents the proportion of
those without a will is nearly 70 percent. Looking only at parents with a will, almost 85
percent of those with regular contacts with all their genetic children report the intention
23The exception is in relation to the probability that respondents bequeath a specific amount of money,
which is asked to each household independently of whether respondents have a will or not. At the end of
subsection 4.B we discuss the results found using that information.
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to include all of them in the will. This proportion is 19 percentage points greater than
that observed among no-contact parents, and the difference is highly significant (panel B).
Finally, parents in regular contact with their children also report they are more likely to
divide equally their estate than no-contact parents (79 and 57 percent respectively). The
difference between these two groups of parents is even greater when we consider divorced
and widowed (panel C). These patterns are consistent with the predictions implied by
exchange models.
C. Explanatory Variables
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables we use to model the prob-
abilities of reporting having a will and reporting the intention to leave unequal bequests.
We show figures for the sample of elderly parents who report having wills (column (b))
and for the broader sample of 23,984 individuals that also includes parents who report
not having wills (column (a)). The table also presents summary statistics for the subsam-
ple of all parents who have both genetic children and stepchildren (column (c)) and the
subsample of 2,342 parents with stepchildren who report having wills (column (d)).24
Our covariates include standard demographic controls for parents’ age, sex, race, mar-
ital status, and number of marriages. These variables capture basic heterogeneity within
and across households. We also include measures of annual family income and total
wealth (both expressed in 1995 prices), parents’ education (highest grade completed) and
employment status. We use these variables as controls for heterogeneity in parental re-
sources. HRS respondents are also asked whether they gave money to at least one child
or to all children equally; inter vivos transfers are known to depend more directly than
bequests on children’s current incomes and thus tend to be divided less evenly (McGarry
1999).
One of our key explanatory variables is an indicator variable for the presence of at
least one genetic child and at least one stepchild. The genetic-child hypothesis predicts
that parents will treat genetic children and stepchildren differently in allocating resources.
Because parents’ ability or willingness to make transfers may depend on the total number
24For the sake of brevity, summary statistics of the independent variables broken down by parental
absence status are not reported.
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of children and stepchildren, we include these characteristics as well.
Another key variable is parental absence, proxied by parents’ lack of contact with
their genetic children. Parents who report having had no contact with at least one of
their genetic children over the previous year are defined to be no-contact parents. In
subsection 4.F we will also consider parents with infrequent contact. This latter group
comprises parents who report having had at least one contact with their children over the
last year, while parents with frequent contacts are those who have contact at least once a
month. Exchange models predict that children with more regular contacts will be more
likely to receive bequests if these children are also more likely to provide care and support
to their needy elderly parents (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985; Cox 1987).
We use parental health status (“poor or fair” as opposed to “good or excellent”) as
a proxy for a parent’s need for children’s services and hence, willingness to pay for them
(i.e., the exchange motive). Using the parents’ reports of the children’s income and wealth
would substantially reduce the number of observations, so instead of doing so we predict
each child’s income using observed characteristics. Following Light and McGarry (2004),
we predict incomes using estimated parameters from income models that we fit to the
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1994 and 2006. Our sample
consists of all CPS respondents in the same age group as the parents/children in our HRS
sample. We estimate separate models for men and women using as regressors a constant,
a quartic in age, five dummy variables indicating the highest educational attainment, and
indicator variables for race, marital status, number of children, and home ownership. We
then use this predicted income variable to construct a measure of income differences, the
coefficient of variation (obtained by dividing the standard deviation of estimated income
by its mean) among the children of each individual.
For each of our covariates, we observe differences between parents with a will, parents
with stepchildren, and parents with stepchildren and a will (columns (b)–(d)). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the most striking differences are between parents in the core files (column
(a)) and those in the exit files (column (e)). Compared with the parents in the core files,
parents in the exit files are less educated and more likely to report being in poor or fair
health in the last wave in which they participated. Parents in the exit files are older (and
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thus more likely to be retired), and more likely to have been widowed (and hence to have
lower household income).
4. Empirical Results
We present our empirical results in six subsections, emphasizing the roles of stepparents
and parents without contact with at least one of their genetic children. We first describe
who has a will and who does not (subsection A). Then we analyze whether parents include
all children in the will and, if they do, whether they intend to leave equal bequests to
all children (subsection B).25 We next investigate how health, wealth, and previous inter
vivos transfers affect the probability that HRS respondents intend to treat their children
unequally (subsection C). In subsection D we exploit the longitudinal aspect of the HRS
examining changes in bequest intentions, while in subsection E we turn from bequest
intentions to the actual division of estates using the exit files. Finally, in subsection F we
examine how contacts and interactions between parents and children in complex families
are related to end-of-life transfers.
A. Who Has a Will and Who Does Not
As we saw in Table 1, the fraction of HRS respondents who have children but do not
have wills is substantial: 42 percent of those in the core files report not having a will.
A complication with bequest intention data is right censoring: some parents who will
eventually write wills have not done so at the time they respond to the survey. Older and
less healthy parents, however, might be more likely than other respondents to write wills.
So might unpartnered widows or widowers, who are the last ones to have the responsibility
of passing on the family estate to future generations. To account for these possibilities, we
control for parental age and health status, and estimate separately the response of widows,
widowers and divorced parents. To assess the extent of the right censoring problem more
directly, we use data from the exit files.26
25It is worth keeping in mind that stepchildren are counted as children.
26As mentioned in Section 3, 38 percent of parents in the exit files died intestate. This slightly lower
proportion than that recorded in the core files may reflect an actual change in parents’ behavior or
selection driven by differential attrition based on age, health, and socioeconomic status. We leave this
interesting issue for future research.
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Table 3 presents random effects probit estimates of the impact of the presence of
stepchildren on the probability that parents report not having a will. The table, based on
data from the core files, shows the results from five specifications. In specification (a) we
include our basic set of controls (demographics, education, and employment status) as well
as health status indicators. Specification (b) adds measures of money transfers to children,
while specification (c) drops these measures but includes controls for parents’ expected
income and wealth. Specification (d) includes all previous measures, while specification
(e) also includes the coefficient of variation between children’s income, as an additional
regressor. Besides the results for all parents, the table also shows results separately for
fathers and for mothers, and reports the pooled and separate effects for the subsamples
of widowed and divorced parents.
Although the descriptive statistics show that individuals with both genetic children
and stepchildren are less likely to report having wills than those with genetic children only,
the estimates in Table 3 imply that our basic control variables largely account for this
difference (column (a)), except for widows and for divorced fathers. Widows are indeed
7 percentage points less likely to have a will. This is confirmed when we control for inter
vivos transfers and parental income and wealth (columns (b)–(d)), but the relationship
becomes weaker and loses statistical significance when we further control for the coefficient
of variation between children’s predicted income (column (e)).
For divorced fathers with stepchildren we find that the probability of having a will is
nearly 8 percentage points greater than the corresponding probability for divorced fathers
with genetic children only (column (a)). Controlling for inter vivos transfers and parental
income and wealth leads to even greater estimates, ranging from 8 to 12 percentage
points (columns (b) to (d)). When we control for within-family income differences, the
probability of not having a will goes up to almost 20 percentage points. In the next
subsection we examine whether the differential propensities to have a will reflect parental
preferences to favor own biological children or preferences to equalize the distribution of
estates across all children, including stepchildren.
Table 4 shows how the probability that parents have no will is affected by contact
between parents and children. The five specifications in this table are those presented in
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Table 3. Among all parents with genetic children only, those who have no contact with
one or more of their children are nearly 15 percentage points more likely to have no will.
The magnitude of this impact varies with the parent’s gender and marital status, but the
effect is generally robust across specifications and subsamples. Lack of contact, therefore,
is associated with a significant reduction in the probability of having a will.
B. Unequal Intended Bequests
Conditional on parents having a will and having more than one child, we now investigate
two questions: whether parents include all children in their wills and whether they treat
all children equally in their wills.
Table 5 presents random effects probit estimates of the stepchild variable on the proba-
bility that individuals include all children in their wills. The five specifications in columns
(a)–(e) and the rest of the organization of the table are the same as in Table 3. Table
5 reveals that for parents with stepchildren the likelihood of including all children in the
will is 28–39 percentage points lower than for parents without stepchildren. This impact
is stronger in absolute value for mothers than for fathers, although controlling for income
dispersion between siblings reverses this result (column (e)). Looking at specification (d),
mothers with stepchildren are almost 38 percentage points less likely to report including
all children in their wills while fathers with stepchildren are about 27 percentage points
less likely to do so. These negative effects are strongest for divorced parents with stepchil-
dren, with estimated impacts ranging between 59 and 63 percentage points lower than for
divorced parents without stepchildren. We also find strong negative effects among widows
and widowers. This might happen because widows and widowers write new wills after
the death of the spouse. In subsection D, where we analyze transitions, we shall return
to this possibility.
We repeated the same analysis but focusing on the behavior of parents who have only
genetic children but with whom they have no contact. The results are in Appendix Table
A2. These are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 5. In particular, parents who
have no contact with at least one of their genetic children are 20 percentage points less
likely to include all children in the will. Divorced or widowed parents show even smaller
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chances of including all of their children in the will. No-contact parents therefore have a
substantially greater propensity to treat their genetic children unequally.
Conditional on having a will, we repeated the same analysis for the likelihood of having
a will in which all children are treated equally. Table 6 reports the random effects probit
estimates for parents with stepchildren, while Appendix Table A3 reports the estimates
for no-contact parents. Table 6 indicates that the presence of stepchildren is always
associated with a considerably lower probability of equal intended bequests and these
differences are always statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For example, having
both genetic children and stepchildren as opposed to having genetic children only reduces
the probability of a will in which all children are treated equally by 31 percentage points
(first row, column (d)). This negative effect is greater for mothers than for fathers (36
versus 25 percentage points, respectively), and the difference is statistically significant at
conventional levels. But, as in Table 5, this gender difference is not robust to the inclusion
of the coefficient of variation of children’s predicted income (column (e)).
Unpartnered parents (either divorced or widowed) are generally less likely to plan equal
bequests if they have genetic children and stepchildren. For example, divorced fathers
are 52 percentage points less likely to treat all children equally than divorced fathers with
genetic children only (column (d)). Similar responses are found for divorced mothers
as well as for widows and widowers, and the gender differences are never statistically
significant.
Without exceptions, the estimates in Appendix Table A3 reveal that parents who have
no contact with their genetic children are also less likely to plan an equal division of their
estates. Parental absence is on average associated with a reduction in the probability of
equal bequest intentions of 25–30 percentage points. Stronger reductions are observed
among all fathers and among those who are divorced or widowed.27
In sum, the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 and those in Appendix Tables A2 and A3
tell a consistent story. Parents in complex families are less likely to mention all their
27The results in Tables 6 and A3 were found on parents with two or more children and a will. An
alternative sample selection is to include only parents with two or more children and a will that mentions
all of the children. This selection clearly leads to smaller samples. But even when this more restrictive
definition is used, we find effect estimates that are in line with (albeit of smaller magnitude than) those
shown in Tables 6 and A3. They are reported in Appendix Table A4.
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children in the will. Among such parents, those who do mention all children are more
likely to plan an unequal division of end-of-life transfers. This evidence suggests that
stepchildren and genetic children with no contact with their parents appear to face similar
chances of inheriting from their stepparents and parents. This result sits at odds with
the genetic-child hypothesis, according to which parents favor their own genetic offspring
over stepchildren, and seems instead to be driven mainly by other motives. In the next
subsection we explore this possibility further.28
C. Health, Wealth, and Inter Vivos Transfers
In our analysis we included variables that are meant to proxy altruism and exchange as
bequest motives. We also controlled for gifts to children, since parents might adjust their
bequest intentions if they made substantial inter vivos transfers. The adjustment could
go in either direction. Parents might give less to children who already received inter vivos
transfers to equalize lifetime transfers, or they might give more because previous transfers
indicate greater need or closer ties. We now briefly discuss these results that can be found
in the web appendix.
In families with stepparents and in families with no-contact parents, wealth and income
have opposite effects on the probability of having a will. Wealthier parents are more likely
to report having a will. But higher income parents are less likely to report having a will,
perhaps because such parents are likely to be younger and still in the labor force. In
both types of families, having made inter vivos transfers is associated with a 5 percentage
point increase in the probability of reporting having a will. Being in fair or poor health
28It should be emphasized that we performed several robustness checks. The estimates from these
exercises by and large uphold the picture on bequest intentions emerged so far. In one of the exercises,
we disaggregated the overall effect of the stepchild (or no contact) indicator variable by the number
of genetic children and stepchildren and distinguished among parents with one child in each category,
those with two genetic children and one stepchild, those with one genetic child and two stepchildren,
and those with two or more children in each category. Virtually all our earlier results are robust to this
change. In another check, we took advantage of the fact that, regardless of whether individuals have a
will, the HRS asks one respondent per household to report the probability of leaving a bequest worth
at least $10,000, $100,000, and $500,000, excluding any inheritance to be left to the surviving partner
if he/she is still alive. We banded all answers into six groups, i.e., we distinguished individuals who
report a zero probability from those with a positive probability, and these in turn were banded into five
quintiles. Using random-effects ordered probit regressions, we then re-analyzed the models of having a
will, inclusion of all children in the will, and equal intended bequests. Again, the results from this analysis
are qualitatively very similar to those discussed above. These and the previous estimates are reported in
the online appendix.
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is associated with a 7 percentage point reduction for stepparents, while the estimated
decrease is 9 percentage points for no-contact parents. Less healthy parents, who might
be more in need of care from their children, may have an incentive to have a will. Finally,
larger differences in children’s incomes are associated with a lower probability of having
a will, although this relationship is not statistically significant.
Wealthier stepparents and no-contact parents are more likely to report including all
children in their wills as well as their intention to divide their estates equally among
children. For parents with stepchildren, greater parental income, which might be more
common among younger (still working) parents, is associated with a reduction in both
probabilities. For such parents, we also estimate that parents who have already made
inter vivos transfers have a 7 percentage point higher probability of including all children
in their wills and 11 percentage point higher probability of intending equal bequests. For
no-contact parent families, the negative relationship with income is weaker and the effect
of inter vivos transfers is smaller. For instance, having already made inter vivos transfers
increases the probability of including all children in the will by 3 percentage points and
the probability of equal bequest intentions by 5 percentage points.
For both types of families, greater income dispersion between siblings is associated with
a lower probability that wills include all children and a greater probability that parents
intend to divide their estates unequally. Although these correlations are not statistically
significant, if we assume that parents intend to give more to low-income children, then
they are consistent with altruistic behavior.
Parents in poor health are 2 to 3 percentage points less likely to include all children
in the will and, conditional on mentioning all children, around 4 percentage points less
likely to include all of them equally. If poor health reflects parents’ long-term need for
child assistance, these results suggest that parents may use their intended future transfers,
which they could make known to their children, to elicit a long-term flow of services. This
is consistent with the exchange motive postulated by Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers
(1985) and documented by Light and McGarry (2004).
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D. Transitions in Bequest Intentions
Exploiting the longitudinal aspect of the HRS, we analyze changes in bequest intentions.
In particular, we focus on the transitions from not having a will to having a will, from
having a will that does not include all children to having a will that includes all children,
and from unequal intended bequests to equal intended bequests. The picture emerging
from the nine transitions in the other directions is consistent with that obtained from the
three transitions just mentioned. They are therefore not presented, but are available in
the web appendix.
Of course, several other transitions might interact with bequest plans and the joint
presence of genetic children and stepchildren or the lack of contact with genetic children,
such as changes in parental health and changes in children’s economic situations. In our
analysis we explicitly consider the interaction of the presence of stepchildren or parental
absence with changes in parents’ marital status (e.g., divorce and death of a spouse).
Table 7 shows the results from a specification similar to specification (d) in Tables
3–6, which includes changes in our basic set of controls, health status, money transfers to
children, and parental income and wealth. The estimates of interest are robust to their
exclusion. In panel A we look at stepparents, while in panel B we focus on no-contact
parents. For each transition, we report two sets of coefficients. In the first column, we
present the impact of having stepchildren or genetic children with whom the parent has
no contact on the transition under study. In the second we also show the interaction
terms of the stepchild or no-contact parent variable with two changes in parental marital
status: from marriage to divorce and from marriage to widowhood. This is important
because, following divorce or the death of a spouse, an individual might write a new will.
In fact, in panels C and D we analyze this possibility more directly by considering only
the subsample of widows and widowers. In this case, we first analyze whether parents
write a new will or change an old will after the death of their partner (first column). In
the second column we then present the estimates of how the presence of stepchildren or
no-contact children changes bequest intentions further.29
Panel A of Table 7 reveals that the transition from not having a will to having a will
29Other interesting changes in marital status (e.g., remarriage and repartnering) cannot be analyzed
separately due to sample size limitations.
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is affected in the same way by the joint presence of stepchildren and genetic children
as by the presence of genetic children only. This is also the case when the presence of
stepchildren is interacted with the two changes in marital status. The joint presence of
genetic children and stepchildren significantly reduces the probability of a transition to
a will in which all children are included as well as the transition from unequal to equal
bequests. Having stepchildren reduces the former transition by almost 9 percentage points
(column (c)) and the latter by around 8 percentage points (column (e)). Controlling for
changes in parents’ marital status does not significantly alter these results (see columns
(d) and (f)).
The presence of stepchildren therefore is negatively correlated not only with the prob-
ability of equal intended bequests but also with the probability of changing the will from
unequal to equal treatment of children. Having lost a partner through divorce or death
generally makes this transition even less likely.
Panel B confirms virtually all the previous results for the case of families with no-
contact parents. Generally the estimated effects are larger in absolute value among these
families than among families with stepparents. The only exceptions are in columns (d)
and (f) where the reductions in the probability that no-contact children are included in the
will and are mentioned equally are not statistically significant if the no-contact parent’s
partner dies. This could be driven by the low statistical power of our small samples. We
assess this issue more directly in the next two panels in which we focus on the subsample
of widows and widowers.
For this subsample we draw attention to four interesting results. First, the estimates
for widowed stepparents are similar to those for no-contact parents. Second, widowhood
in all complex families increases the likelihood of changing bequest intentions: it increases
the transition to writing a will, having a will in which all children are mentioned, and
having a will in which all children are equally included (columns (a), (c), and (e)). Third,
stepchildren or no-contact children neither increase nor decrease parents’ greater propen-
sity of writing a will (column (b)), but offset their parents’ greater propensities of including
all children in the wills and including them all equally (columns (d) and (f)). Fourth,
the presence of stepchildren combined with a spouse loss further reduces the likelihood of
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moving to a will with full inclusion by 13 percentage points and the likelihood of moving
to a will with equal division by 9 percentage points (panel C). Such further reductions
are not observed among no-contact parents (panel D). This evidence is in line with what
we found in the top two panels.
E. Actual End-of-Life Transfers: Evidence from the Exit Files
The HRS exit files provide direct information about end-of-life transfers. The exit files
contain reports by the surviving spouse or partner or by other close family members of
the deceased HRS respondent and they allow us to analyze the actual division of estates
rather than bequest intentions. Unlike the core files, the exit files do not suffer from right
censoring but they are much smaller than the core files and the HRS respondents who die
early are not a random subsample of HRS respondents.
Table 8 gives a summary of our results. For each outcome we show probit estimates
from two specifications. The first includes controls for standard demographics (column
(a)), while the second further controls for year-of-death fixed effects, an indicator for
whether the death was expected, earlier transfers to children, and parental wealth (column
(b)).30
When looking at the probability of intestate succession (in the first two columns of
Table 8), the estimated coefficient of the stepchild variable is always statistically indis-
tinguishable from 0. This result, which holds true across all family types and for both
fathers and mothers, confirms the general findings reported in Table 3. From the exit
files, however, we detect neither the negative effect for widows nor the positive effect for
divorced fathers which were found using the core files. This might reflect an actual change
in parents’ behavior. But it could also be due to the low statistical power implied by the
small sample size of the exit files.
In the next two columns, we consider the probability of including all children in the
will. This is estimated on the subsample of HRS respondents who wrote a will, while
those who died intestate are not included. We generally find that having stepchildren
30The table reports the estimates on the stepchild indicator found among families with stepparents.
The exit files do not allow us to perform the same analysis on parents who did not have contacts with
their genetic children.
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does not affect the likelihood that all children are included (column (a)). This result
emerges for the full sample as well as for all the subsamples of mothers and fathers by
marital status. It contradicts what we found in Table 5 using the core files. Indeed, in
two out of the nine cases under specification (b), we even find a positive and significant
effect of the stepparent indicator. This result might indicate a strategy according to which
stepparents end up including all their children (including stepchildren) in their final will.
Would all children be included equally? The last two columns, where we present the
estimates for the probability of equal bequests, suggest that they are not.31 In fact,
in line with the bequest intention estimates of Table 6, the results in Table 8 indicate
that the presence of stepchildren reduces the probability that actual bequests are equal
by 9 percentage points (first line, specification (a)). This impact is roughly a fourth
of the magnitude of the corresponding impact on intended bequests. As in the case of
the core files, the estimated effect of stepchildren on equal actual bequests is greater
for fathers than for mothers, although the relatively large standard errors make this
differential response by gender statistically indistinguishable from 0. We also cannot
detect differential impacts for the subpopulations of parents who experienced divorce or
the death of a spouse or partner. But the probability of equal bequests is particularly
low for divorced mothers and widowers, with estimated effects similar to those we found
for the intended bequests. Some of these effects lose their statistical significance when we
estimate specification (b), but by and large the main pattern of results is confirmed.
In sum, the presence of stepchildren does not affect the probability of writing a will.
Stepparents might explicitly decide to rely on intestacy statutes which would leave nothing
to stepchildren. For parents who die with a will, there is evidence that they include all
children. But the actual bequests observed in the exit files are consistent with the bequest
intentions reported in the core files. Unequal bequests are a distinguishing feature of
individuals with both step- and genetic children and, in the actual division of estates,
genetic children are favored over stepchildren.
31As before, this analysis is based only on the subsample of parents who died with a will.
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F. Interactions between Parents and Children
We now focus on how interactions between parents and children are related to the prob-
ability that the children are mentioned in the will.32
We first look at the stepparent–stepchild interaction and investigate whether stepchil-
dren are less likely to be included in the will of a stepparent when the stepparent also has
genetic children. Table 9 presents random effects probit estimates of the probability that
a stepchild is mentioned in the stepparent will for the whole sample of stepchildren. The
table shows the results from five specifications. In specification (a) we include a basic set
of controls (i.e., parent and child’s age and gender), the age at which the child became
a stepchild, and the number of years spent with the stepparent. Specification (b) also
controls for whether the stepparent reported providing care for the stepchild’s child(ren),
while specification (c) includes an indicator of whether the stepchild was the main re-
cipient of inter vivos transfers from the stepparent. Specification (d) adds a measure of
the stepchild’s predicted income, which was constructed using the procedure described
in Section 3. Finally, in specification (e) we add controls for the within-family difference
between the stepchild’s predicted income and the genetic child’s income (or the income
mean when there are two or more genetic children). We distinguish two subgroups, one
in which the stepchild’s income is more than 50 percent lower than the genetic child’s,
and the other in which the (negative) difference is between 1 and 50 percent.33
Table 9 reveals that for a child whose stepparent also has a genetic child the probability
of being included in the will is 3–4 percentage points lower, an average impact of about 15
percent (columns (a)–(e)). This is consistent with the genetic-child hypothesis according
to which parents tend to favor children who share their genes. This negative relationship is
entirely eliminated, however, if the stepchild’s predicted income is lower than the genetic
child’s, and is more than outbalanced if the income difference is less than 50 percent
(specification (e)). Nearly two-fifths of stepchildren in the sample have relatively lower
incomes. This finding is consistent with altruism if parents not only are more likely to
32We cannot directly focus on the stepchild’s or no-contact child’s perspectives because in the HRS we
have information only on parents and stepparents.
33We checked the sensitivity of this cutoff using different partitions, and found results that are essen-
tially identical to those shown in Table 9. These alternative estimates are thus not reported.
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mention low-income stepchildren in their wills (as we find here), but also give them more.
We cannot test this last point because the HRS does not contain any information about
the amount that the respondents intend to bequeath to each child.
Across all specifications, the older the stepparent the higher the likelihood that the
stepchild is included in the will: the stepchild penalty is fully offset if the stepparent is
10 years older than the average stepparent. This may indicate a greater need for the
stepchild’s assistance. These findings mirror the relationship between parents and their
genetic children. In particular, they suggest that stepparents may use bequests to elicit a
long-term flow of reciprocal services rather than episodic short-term care. It is possible,
in fact, that episodic short-term care could be “paid for” by inter vivos transfers. This
behavior is consistent with the strategic use of bequests postulated by Bernheim, Shleifer
and Summers (1985). Children whose stepparents are in poor/fair health (another possible
indicator of need) have however a 5 percentage point decrease in the probability of being
included in the will.
Table 9 also shows that, regardless of the age at which a child acquired the stepparent,
the more years he/she spent with the stepparent the higher the likelihood of being in-
cluded in the will: 7–9 years of stepchildhood completely eliminate the stepchild penalty.
Moreover, a stepchild’s probability of inclusion in the will goes up by about 6–8 percent-
age points if the stepparent reports having provided care for the stepchild’s child(ren)
(specifications (b)–(e)) and by another 13–14 percentage points if the stepchild is also the
main recipient of inter vivos transfers (specifications (c)–(e)). This may reflect trust and
bonding, which are strengthened by repeated interactions over longer time periods.
Stratifying the sample by gender (see Appendix Tables A5 and A6), we find that
the negative association between the probability of being mentioned in the will and the
presence of a step-sibling (i.e., the variable ‘stepparent has own genetic children’) is con-
centrated among male stepchildren, who experience a reduction in this probability of
about 5–7 percentage points. Female stepchildren experience a reduction of at most 3
percentage points but this reduction is never statistically significant. For female stepchil-
dren the probability of being mentioned in the will is also unaffected by differences in
children’s predicted incomes. The same pattern of results, with the same gender differ-
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ences, persists when we focus on the subsamples of stepchildren of divorced and widowed
parents. These results are reported in the online appendix.
We now turn our attention to no-contact parent–genetic child interactions and inves-
tigate how contacts in complex families affect bequest intentions. In Table 10 we report
how the probability that a child of a no-contact parent is mentioned in the parent’s will
varies with the frequency of contact and with the fact that the parent’s spouse is not
genetically related to the child.34 The first two columns of the table show that parents
who have no contact with their genetic children are 21–24 percentage points less likely to
mention them in their wills. The lack of parent–child contact therefore more than halves
the child’s odds of inclusion in the parent’s will. Having infrequent rather than frequent
contacts also reduces the likelihood of inclusion by 14–15 percentage points, but, as indi-
cated by the p-values at the bottom of the table, the difference between having infrequent
contacts and not having them at all is always statistically significant. These results do
not change when we add controls for child’s income and other parent-child interaction
terms (e.g., grandchild’s care and inter vivos transfers).
Notice however that the “no-contact genetic child penalty” is fully offset if the child
is the main recipient of inter vivos transfers. This might reflect earlier (more frequent)
interactions. Similarly, if the no-contact child is a female, her penalty is reduced by 60–90
percent, perhaps reflecting other services expected by the parent but not observed in the
HRS.
In columns (c) and (d) we explore how the child’s odds of being mentioned in the will
change not only when the child has infrequent or no contact with the parent but also if
he/she is not the genetic child of the parent’s partner. We find that, if the no-contact
child is also genetically unrelated to the parent’s partner, his/her probability of being
included in the will is further reduced by 8 percentage points (column (c)). This means
that for no-contact stepchildren the odds of inclusion are essentially reduced to zero. As
before, being the main recipient of inter vivos transfers and being a female will reduce
the penalty substantially but will not eliminate it entirely.
34Due to small sample size we could not estimate a specification which included the within-family
coefficient of variation in children’s income. We thus cannot use the estimates in Table 10 to assess the
role played by altruism.
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We also conducted this analysis separately for male and female children, the results
of which are shown in web appendix. In general, the effects are similar for both men
and women, except that female children who are not the genetic children of the parent’s
partner face an additional penalty only if they have have no contacts with their parents,
but no further penalty if they have infrequent contacts with them.
In sum, parents are more likely to transfer resources to children who share their genes
than to stepchildren who are genetically unrelated to them. But a simple evolutionary
story, such as the genetic-child hypothesis, does not seem appropriate to explain what
we observe in the data as, for example, in the case of no-contact parents. Furthermore,
bequests to stepchildren are affected by altruistic and exchange motives. Parents are likely
to leave bequests to their low-income stepchildren suggesting altruistic motives. And
stepchildren are more likely to be mentioned in their stepparents’ wills if the stepparents
are older suggesting exchange motives. Trust and bonding seem to be highly relevant too
within all complex families: there is no stepchild penalty if stepparents help with child
care or have already made other transfers. Similar patterns occur between parents and
their no-contact genetic children. The relationship between stepchildren and parents in
complex families requires deeper, more subtle explanations than those provided by the
genetic-child hypothesis.
5. Theory
Here we provide a simple framework to interpret the results of the previous section. We
borrow our key insights from the work by Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982, 1986,
1995).
Consider a family comprised of one elderly parent (e.g., the surviving spouse) and two
children, child g who is her genetic child and child s who is her stepchild.35 Suppose
the parent has a separable welfare function defined over expected bequests for each child,
W (Bg, Bs). The parents maximize W subject to three constraints. The first constraint is
the budget constraint that applies to resources devoted to bequests. Such resources are
denoted by R, while investments are denoted by H. Assume parents face a fixed price for
35Alternatively, child s could be seen as the genetic child with whom the elderly parent has no contact.
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their investments and the price is identical for both children. Normalizing the investment
price to 1, we can write the constraint as Hg +Hs ≤ R.
The other two constrains are the bequest production functions, one for each child.
One of the arguments of these functions is bequest related investments, H, which include
the full history of each child’s health and human capital investments as well as material
help and money transfers that parents have made over their children’s lives and that,
in turn, might depend on child attributes, such as age and sex. Child-specific income
and family circumstances are also determinants of such investments. Another argument,
labeled P , comprises bequest-relevant parental characteristics, such as age, sex, marital
status, health, income, and wealth. A final category, labeled T , includes variables that
determine the trust relationship between each child and the parent. This takes account
of physical proximity, contact, and bonding between parent and child, and is signaled by
and shaped by repeated interactions and relative bargaining powers. Putting together
these arguments leads us to a child-specific bequest production function of the form,
Bk = B(Hk, Pk, Tk), k = g, s.
Provided the constrained maximization faced by the parent has an interior solution,
the first-order condition for parental bequest related investment for child k is
∂W
∂Bk
∂Bk
∂Hk
− λ = 0,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint that applies to resources
devoted to bequest related investments for the two children. Expressing the first-order
conditions in ratio form yields
∂W/∂Bs
∂W/∂Bg
=
∂Bg/∂Hg
∂Bs/∂Hs
.
This expression, which does not include the unobservable λ, corresponds to the standard
tangency condition for a constrained maximum, i.e., the slope of the parental welfare
function equals the slope of the bequest possibility frontier for child s versus child g. This
is illustrated by point A in Figure 6. In this figure, we assume equal concern for both
children, so the indifference curves are symmetrical around the 45 degree line from the
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origin. We also assume a symmetric bequest possibility frontier. Taken together, these
two assumptions imply equal bequests in equilibrium, B∗g = B
∗
s .
Because in the previous section we found strong evidence of unequal bequest intentions
that favor biological children over stepchildren, we consider changes in the assumptions
underlying Figure 6. A straightforward change is to allow for unequal concern. This case
is illustrated in Figure 7, with parental preferences favoring the child genetically linked
to the parent, that is child g. If the production possibility frontier remains symmetric, a
parent with unequal concern favoring the genetic child will divide the estates unequally,
in such a way that B∗g > B
∗
s .
Another departure from the benchmark of Figure 6 is through a change in the produc-
tion possibility frontier, while keeping the assumption of equal concern. Parents might
have skewed bequest related investments in favor of their genetic children, or genetic chil-
dren might have greater bargaining power (emotional capital) toward their parents than
stepchildren do. Point E∗ in Figure 8 illustrates this case. Clearly, if parents also have
unequal concern favoring their genetic children, then the bequest division between the
stepchild and the genetic child could be even more unequal, as illustrated by point E ′ in
the figure.
The results in subsection 4.F suggest that the situation is less unfavorable to stepchil-
dren if there is greater bonding and trust between them and their stepparents and if
stepparents have greater access to the stepchildren’s family-specific capital. This bonding
and trust is signaled and fostered by the stepparent providing care for the stepchild’s
children or making direct transfers to the stepchild. When this happens, the bequest pos-
sibility frontier can shift and the household will reach the new equilibrium E ′′ in Figure
8 (under the assumption of equal concern).
6. Conclusion
In the last thirty years, American families have experienced massive changes: a retreat
from marriage, increased divorce and remarriage, and growth in cohabitation and non-
marital childbearing. Stepparents and no-contact parents in complex families may be less
motivated than parents in traditional families to provide resources to children with whom
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they do not share their genes or have not shared their homes. And children in complex
families may be less willing than children in traditional families to assist disabled elderly
parents, especially those with whom they have no genetic connection or only briefly shared
a home.
For younger cohorts, nonmarital fertility of cohabiting couples who break up and
repartner will substantially increase the prevalence of complex families. Those in the
HRS cohort are older, and their complex families are generally a by-product of divorce
and remarriage. The implications for intergenerational transfers of these changes in family
structure are difficult to predict because complex families created by cohabitation and
nonmarital fertility in younger cohorts may behave differently from those created by
divorce and remarriage in older cohorts.
We have shown that bequests are much more unequal now than in the recent past and
much more unequal than generally recognized. In noncomplex families (i.e., families with
neither stepchildren nor no-contact children), equal bequests are the dominant pattern.
In complex families, however, we find substantial inequality in both bequest intentions
and actual bequests. We cannot assess the relative importance of genetic ties and contact
by studying noncomplex families because in such families all of the children have the same
genetic ties with their parents. But the bequest patterns we find in complex families imply
that contact trumps genetic ties.
The economics literature on end-of-life transfers assumes that individuals, or at least
elderly individuals, make wills. We find instead that parents often fail to write wills and,
either by design or default, rely on intestacy law to determine the distribution of their
estates. For parents with stepchildren, the effect of relying on intestacy law is to leave
everything to genetic and legally-adopted children and nothing to stepchildren. For no-
contact parents, the effect of relying on intestacy law is to treat contact and no-contact
genetic children equally. If parents understand the most basic provisions of intestacy law,
this finding is puzzling. It implies that parents who have had no contact with some of
their genetic children are more likely to treat all of their genetic children equally than
are parents who have maintained contact with all of their genetic children. We suspect
that the absence of wills reflects the disutility of making wills (and contemplating death)
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rather than preferences for the distribution mandated by intestacy law. Unfortunately,
HRS provides no evidence that speaks to this issue. Regardless of parents’ motivations
for not making wills, we have shown that focusing exclusively on bequest intentions (i.e.,
on parents who make wills) provides an incomplete and misleading picture of end-of-life
transfers.
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Figure 1: Unequal Bequest Intentions, by Parent’s Gender
Figure 2: Unequal Bequest Intentions, by Parent’s Birth Cohort
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Figure 3: Unequal Bequest Intentions, by Parent’s Marital Status
Figure 4: Unequal Bequest Intentions, by the Family Type
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Figure 5: Trends in Intestacy Rates, by Parent’s Age and Family Type
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Figure 6: Equal Concern and Symmetric Bequest Possibility Frontier
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Figure 7: Unequal Concern Favoring Child j and Symmetric Bequest Possibility Frontier
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Figure 8: Asymmetric Bequest Possibility Frontiers With and Without Equal Concern
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Parents with Parents with
step- and biological Difference
All biological children (b)-(c)
children only (t-value) N n
A. No will
Core files
All 0.418 0.475 0.406 0.069*** 117,189 23,984
(18.152)
Divorced 0.623 0.663 0.617 0.046*** 13,703 3,754
( 3.784)
Widowed 0.376 0.395 0.373 0.022** 27,308 7,679
( 2.580)
Exit files
All 0.375 0.401 0.371 0.030* 7,416 7,416
( 1.957)
Divorced 0.570 0.587 0.567 0.020 702 702
(0.356)
Widowed 0.348 0.370 0.346 0.024 3,220 3,220
(0.928)
B. Will includes all children
Core files
All 0.746 0.462 0.805 -0.343*** 60,994 14,275
(76.840)
Divorced 0.734 0.293 0.808 -0.515*** 4,363 1,456
(29.636)
Widowed 0.761 0.358 0.834 -0.476*** 14,597 4,583
(52.965)
Exit files
All 0.587 0.618 0.581 0.037* 4,567 4,567
(1.816)
Divorced 0.801 0.774 0.806 -0.033 337 337
(0.547)
Widowed 0.856 0.876 0.853 0.022 1,956 1,956
(0.878)
C. Equal intended and actual bequest
Core files
All 0.676 0.390 0.735 -0.345*** 60,994 14,275
(71.539)
Divorced 0.641 0.245 0.708 -0.462*** 4,363 1,456
(23.747)
Widowed 0.679 0.291 0.749 -0.459*** 14,597 4,583
(45.638)
Exit files
All 0.473 0.421 0.484 -0.063*** 3,878 3,878
(2.998)
Divorced 0.604 0.453 0.639 -0.186** 280 280
(2.511)
Widowed 0.712 0.608 0.729 -0.120*** 1,610 1,610
(3.656)
Note: N=number of observations; n=number of individuals. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Explanatory Variables
Parents
with Parents Parents
All Parents step- and with step- included
with biological children in the
a will children and a will exit filesa
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 if has step- and biological children 0.223 0.196 1.000 1.000 0.136
Demographics
Female 0.564 0.557 0.559 0.573 0.529
Age 68.59 70.76 65.64 68.65 78.17
(10.59) (10.32) (10.81) (10.66) (10.39)
1 if white 0.829 0.927 0.797 0.910 0.833
1 if married or partnered 0.644 0.672 0.692 0.699 0.476
1 if separated, divorced
or never married 0.123 0.078 0.123 0.082 0.096
1 if widowed 0.233 0.250 0.185 0.218 0.429
Number of marriages 1.355 1.312 1.920 1.951 1.347
(0.668) (0.612) (0.815) (0.767) (0.664)
Health
1 if in poor/fair health 0.297 0.246 0.286 0.242 0.622
Education
1 if below high school 0.368 0.317 0.350 0.314 0.423
1 if high school 0.341 0.350 0.338 0.349 0.306
1 if college or more 0.292 0.333 0.312 0.337 0.271
Employment
1 if in the labor force 0.412 0.366 0.459 0.392 0.068
1 if disabled 0.082 0.046 0.099 0.056 0.154
1 if retired 0.506 0.588 0.443 0.551 0.778
Child variables
Number of children 3.522 3.274 5.004 4.852 3.464
(2.092) (1.860) (2.436) (2.272) (2.219)
Number of bio children 3.092 2.889 3.075 2.887 3.129
(1.791) (1.551) (1.878) (1.691) (1.993)
Number of stepchildren 0.430 0.384 1.929 1.965 0.335
(1.149) (1.077) (1.741) (1.682) (1.102)
Coefficient of within-family variation 0.411 0.398 0.449 0.433 0.414
for children’s predicted incomeb (0.356) (0.265) (0.382) (0.217) (0.230)
(cont.)
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(cont.)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Financial variables
Real annual 26,940 28,271 29,788 32,492 7,630
household incomec (205,093) (157,141) (44,663) (56,093) (18,500)
Real wealthd 267,702 387,954 231,881 351,730 238,948
(1,268,856) (1,543,720) (1,084,812) (1,370,953) (1,521,039)
1 if gave money to
at least a childe 0.362 0.411 0.379 0.424 0.255
1 if gave money to
all children equallye 0.079 0.101 0.032 0.415 0.081
N 117,189 68,248 26,111 13,348 7,071
n 23,984 12,763 5,082 2,342 7,071
Note: Figures are means and standard deviations (for continuous variables only) are in parentheses.
N=number of observations; n=number of individuals.
a Values are from the last year of observation in the core files. For some of the variables, N and n are
different from the values given at the bottom of the table. They are available from the authors.
b Based on 60,055 observations from 8,776 individuals.
c In 1995 values, and based on 74,099 observations from 13,323 respondents.
d In 1995 values, and based on 52,078 observations from 10,830 respondents; includes values of
financial and real estate properties.
e Based on 78,773 observations from 15,493 respondents.
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Table 3: Effect of Having Stepchildren on the Probability of Not Having a Will
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate 0.006 0.003 -0.017 -0.014 -0.028
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.030)
N 117,189 78,773 67,615 51,761 32,199
n 23,984 21,178 16,198 15,041 9,285
Mothers Estimate -0.009 -0.017 -0.051* -0.045 -0.037
(s.e.) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036)
N 66,098 52,419 36,763 33,001 25,084
n 13,498 12,662 9,055 8,824 6,854
Fathers Estimate 0.024 0.032 0.011 0.019 0.011
(s.e.) (0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.033) (0.056)
N 51,091 26,354 30,852 18,760 7,115
n 10,509 8,530 7,152 6,225 2,435
Widows and widowers Estimate -0.049 -0.052 -0.026 -0.028 -0.007
(s.e.) (0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024)
N 27,308 26,986 21,135 20,972 16,104
n 7,679 7,638 6,662 6,637 5,248
Widows Estimate -0.074** -0.069** -0.043** -0.041** -0.019
(s.e.) (0.033) (0.034) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024)
N 22,416 22,196 17,179 17,073 13,152
n 5,960 5,935 5,158 5,142 4,085
Widowers Estimate 0.019 -0.007 0.046 0.022 0.044
(s.e.) (0.072) (0.071) (0.066) (0.063) (0.076)
N 4,892 4,790 3,956 3,899 2,952
n 1,725 1,709 1,509 1,500 1,166
Divorced parents Estimate 0.033 0.048 0.106** 0.105** 0.116**
(s.e.) (0.031) (0.034) (0.048) (0.051) (0.056)
N 13,703 13,140 10,087 9,853 7,006
n 3,754 3,653 3,034 2,999 2,118
Divorced mothers Estimate -0.019 0.020 0.107 0.097 -0.050
(s.e.) (0.054) (0.051) (0.073) (0.078) (0.138)
N 8,916 8,690 6,496 6,425 4,715
n 2,346 2,311 1,878 1,872 1,372
Divorced fathers Estimate 0.076* 0.082* 0.118* 0.121* 0.195***
(s.e.) (0.044) (0.048) (0.062) (0.065) (0.060)
N 4,787 4,450 3,591 3,428 2,291
n 1,411 1,344 1,156 1,127 746
Note: The figures are marginal effects of the parent with stepchildren indicator from random effects pro-
bit models. The comparison group is given by parents with biological children only. See the text
for an explanation of specifications (a)–(e).
N=number of observations; n=number of individuals. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Effect of No Contacts on the Probability of Not Having a Will
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate 0.145*** 0.155*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.148***
(s.e.) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
N 41,075 34,127 24,437 22,450 18,118
n 12,739 11,868 8,767 8,529 6,927
Mothers Estimate 0.120*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.144***
(s.e.) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047)
N 33,844 27,895 19,196 17,628 14,381
n 9,847 9,259 6,557 6,401 5,246
Fathers Estimate 0.213*** 0.223*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.137**
(s.e.) (0.060) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.069)
N 7,231 6,232 5,241 4,822 3,737
n 2,900 2,615 2,211 2,129 1,682
Widows and widowers Estimate 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.075**
(s.e.) (0.044) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
N 14,384 14,291 11,224 11,164 9,198
n 5,352 5,331 4,653 4,634 3,804
Widows Estimate 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.085** 0.082** 0.076**
(s.e.) (0.051) (0.051) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
N 11,887 11,815 9,167 9,121 7,514
n 4,237 4,220 3,667 3,652 2,992
Widowers Estimate 0.203** 0.186** 0.088 0.082 0.059
(s.e.) (0.083) (0.080) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
N 2,497 2,476 2,057 2,043 1,684
n 1,118 1,114 987 983 813
Divorced parents Estimate 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.124**
(s.e.) (0.027) (0.028) (0.045) (0.044) (0.050)
N 7,897 7,817 5,893 5,847 4,391
n 2,792 2,776 2,280 2,264 1,699
Divorced mothers Estimate 0.0488 0.0525* 0.123** 0.130** 0.141**
(s.e.) (0.032) (0.032) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058)
N 5,483 5,441 4,026 4,005 3,073
n 1,851 1,848 1,504 1,499 1,150
Divorced fathers Estimate 0.131** 0.137** 0.120 0.130* 0.103
(s.e.) (0.054) (0.055) (0.074) (0.074) (0.088)
N 2,414 2,376 1,867 1,842 1,318
n 943 930 776 765 549
Note: The figures are marginal effects of the no-contact parent indicator from random effects probit
models. See the note to Table 3 for further explanations.
N=number of observations; n=number of individuals. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Effect of Having Stepchildren on the Probability that the Will Includes All
Children
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate -0.279*** -0.311*** -0.305*** -0.328*** -0.385***
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029)
N 60,994 39,761 37,446 28,031 19,435
n 14,275 12,328 9,762 8,956 6,168
Mothers Estimate -0.360*** -0.359*** -0.391*** -0.377*** -0.365***
(s.e.) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034)
N 33,529 25,862 19,639 17,535 15,302
n 7,827 7,243 5,267 5,112 4,589
Fathers Estimate -0.190*** -0.251*** -0.215*** -0.266*** -0.435***
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.057)
N 27,465 13,899 17,807 10,496 4,133
n 6,460 5,091 4,500 3,848 1,581
Widows and widowers Estimate -0.421*** -0.398*** -0.393*** -0.374*** -0.377***
(s.e.) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045)
N 14,597 14,402 12,620 12,514 11,075
n 4,583 4,554 4,207 4,187 3,817
Widows Estimate -0.444*** -0.433*** -0.419*** -0.408*** -0.410***
(s.e.) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
N 11,911 11,776 10,247 10,178 9,064
n 3,548 3,529 3,247 3,235 2,975
Widowers Estimate -0.343*** -0.258*** -0.288*** -0.225** -0.219**
(s.e.) (0.101) (0.010) (0.104) (0.101) (0.107)
N 2,686 2,626 2,373 2,336 2,011
n 1,039 1,029 963 955 843
Divorced parents Estimate -0.604*** -0.629*** -0.605*** -0.630*** -0.589***
(s.e.) (0.068) (0.073) (0.078) (0.080) (0.097)
N 4,363 4,172 3,664 3,573 2,960
n 1,456 1,413 1,257 1,237 994
Divorced mothers Estimate -0.495*** -0.477*** -0.467*** -0.469*** -0.462***
(s.e.) (0.117) (0.132) (0.147) (0.154) (0.166)
N 2,818 2,741 2,385 2,356 2,042
n 877 863 763 759 645
Divorced fathers Estimate -0.633*** -0.678*** -0.623*** -0.660*** -0.581***
(s.e.) (0.086) (0.088) (0.095) (0.097) (0.137)
N 1,545 1,431 1,279 1,217 918
n 580 550 494 478 349
Note: See the note to Table 3.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Effect of Having Stepchildren on the Probability that Stepparents Intend to
Divide their Estate Equally Among All Children
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate -0.285*** -0.310*** -0.288*** -0.311*** -0.375***
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
N 60,994 39,761 37,446 28,031 19,435
n 14,275 12,328 9,762 8,956 6,168
Mothers Estimate -0.371*** -0.365*** -0.376*** -0.358*** -0.347***
(s.e.) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033)
N 33,529 25,862 19,639 17,535 15,302
n 7,827 7,243 5,267 5,112 4,589
Fathers Estimate -0.185*** -0.233*** -0.195*** -0.246*** -0.427***
(s.e.) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.051)
N 27,465 13,899 17,807 10,496 4,133
n 6,460 5,091 4,500 3,848 1,581
Widows and widowers Estimate -0.404*** -0.386*** -0.382*** -0.362*** -0.357***
(s.e.) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043)
N 14,597 14,402 12,620 12,514 11,075
n 4,583 4,554 4,207 4,187 3,817
Widows Estimate -0.422*** -0.413*** -0.404*** -0.392*** -0.386***
(s.e.) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
N 11,911 11,776 10,247 10,178 9,064
n 3,548 3,529 3,247 3,235 2,975
Widowers Estimate -0.325*** -0.265*** -0.275*** -0.225** -0.206*
(s.e.) (0.096) (0.100) (0.102) (0.103) (0.111)
N 2,686 2,626 2,373 2,336 2,011
n 1,039 1,029 963 955 843
Divorced parents Estimate -0.468*** -0.502*** -0.478*** -0.497*** -0.469***
(s.e.) (0.060) (0.064) (0.069) (0.071) (0.085)
N 4,363 4,172 3,664 3,573 2,960
n 1,456 1,413 1,257 1,237 994
Divorced mothers Estimate -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.324** -0.303** -0.284*
(s.e.) (0.108) (0.121) (0.132) (0.140) (0.152)
N 2,818 2,741 2,385 2,356 2,042
n 877 863 763 759 645
Divorced fathers Estimate -0.468*** -0.510*** -0.493*** -0.523*** -0.524***
(s.e.) (0.077) (0.079) (0.084) (0.085) (0.114)
N 1,545 1,431 1,279 1,217 918
n 580 550 494 478 349
Note: See the note to Table 3.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Changes in Parents’ Bequest Intentions
Transition
From ‘not all children
From ‘not all children in the will’ to ‘all
From ‘no will’ in the will’ to ‘all children equally
to ‘will’ children in the will’ in the will’
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Panel A: Parents with Stepchildren
Parent has stepchildren 0.001 0.016 -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.078*** -0.058**
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.025)
Parent has stepchildren × 0.012 -0.238*** -0.169***
from married to divorced (0.039) (0.032) (0.048)
Parent has stepchildren × -0.012 -0.150*** -0.113***
from married to widowed (0.022) (0.029) (0.029)
N 22,455 8,146 8,759 4,243 11,470 5,279
n 7,945 4,076 4,212 2,522 5,290 3,089
Panel B : No-contact Parents
No-contact parent -0.007 -0.013 -0.114*** -0.124** -0.112*** -0.127***
(0.007) (0.023) (0.019) (0.054) (0.016) (0.045)
No-contact parent × 0.169 -0.311*** -0.205*
from married to divorced (0.118) (0.076) (0.111)
No-contact parent × 0.090 -0.063 -0.089
from married to widowed (0.060) (0.098) (0.083)
N 10,392 2,402 2,553 867 3,717 1,136
n 4,529 1,455 1,604 647 2,211 840
Panel C : Widowed Parents and Parents with Stepchildren
Widowed parent 0.099*** 0.114*** 0.083*** 0.147*** 0.050** 0.085***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.020) (0.025)
Parent has stepchildren 0.039* -0.114*** -0.091***
(0.022) (0.035) (0.031)
Widowed parent × -0.032 -0.127*** -0.092***
Parent has stepchildren (0.021) (0.035) (0.033)
N 4,191 4,191 2,336 2,336 2,917 2,917
n 2,167 2,167 1,448 1,448 1,776 1,776
Panel D : Widowed Parents and No-contact Parents
Widowed parent 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.168*** 0.199*** 0.092*** 0.128***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.035) (0.049) (0.029) (0.041)
No-contact parent 0.001 -0.141*** -0.133***
(0.025) (0.054) (0.046)
Widowed parent × 0.070 -0.032 -0.075
no-contact parent (0.058) (0.103) (0.087)
N 2,848 1,979 1,246 786 1,704 1,043
n 1,507 1,183 826 589 1,111 774
Note: See the notes to Tables 3. All figures are computed on the core files.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Effect of Having Stepchildren on Actual Bequest Decisions from the Exit Files
Probability of: No will Inclusion of Equal
all children division
in the will
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
All parents Estimate -0.003 0.007 -0.009 0.075** -0.093*** -0.043
(s.e.) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035)
N 7,674 7,221 3,952 3,753 3,952 3,753
Mothers Estimate -0.015 -0.020 0.003 0.033 -0.045 -0.029
(s.e.) (0.038) (0.040) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.056)
N 4,052 3,833 1,951 1,861 1,951 1,861
Fathers Estimate -0.013 0.022 0.031 0.102** -0.077** -0.043
(s.e.) (0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.041)
N 3,622 3,385 2,001 1,890 2,001 1,890
Widowed parents Estimate 0.022 0.019 0.048 0.032 -0.078 -0.094*
(s.e.) (0.039) (0.041) (0.032) (0.036) (0.053) (0.057)
N 3,233 3,134 1,597 1,548 1,597 1,548
Widows Estimate 0.033 0.018 0.060 0.054 0.004 0.001
(s.e.) (0.050) (0.052) (0.046) (0.046) (0.067) (0.068)
N 2,428 2,350 1,169 1,132 1,169 1,132
Widowers Estimate -0.035 -0.002 -0.031 -0.068 -0.265*** -0.352***
(s.e.) (0.067) (0.070) (0.056) (0.070) (0.091) (0.101)
N 805 783 428 415 428 415
Divorced parents Estimate 0.022 0.071 -0.071 -0.039 -0.228 -0.216
(s.e.) (0.086) (0.097) (0.123) (0.121) (0.139) (0.145)
N 715 684 281 273 281 273
Divorced mothers Estimate 0.195 0.249 -0.138 -0.137 -0.418* -0.473**
(s.e.) (0.164) (0.176) (0.231) (0.222) (0.222) (0.211)
N 387 376 144 142 144 142
Divorced fathers Estimate -0.032 0.018 -0.024 0.049 -0.168 -0.102
(s.e.) (0.101) (0.115) (0.155) (0.153) (0.178) (0.191)
N 328 307 137 131 137 131
Note: See the text for an explanation of specifications (a)–(b).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Probability that a Stepchild is Explicitly Mentioned in His/Her Stepparent’s
Will
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Mean of dependent variable 0.254 0.254 0.239 0.262 0.261
Stepparent has own -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.031** -0.035** -0.035***
biological children (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Years spent with stepparent 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 )
Age at marriage: 0-6a -0.006 -0.006 0.040* 0.067** 0.073**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)
Age at marriage: 7-12a -0.015 -0.015 -0.001 0.014 0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
Age at marriage: 13-18a -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.010 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Stepchild is female 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.074*** 0.063***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Age of stepchild -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is female 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.002 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Stepparent age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is in -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.056***
poor/fair health (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Stepparent takes care 0.064*** 0.082*** 0.078** 0.079**
of stepchild’s child(ren) (0.019) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Stepchild is main recipient 0.143*** 0.128*** 0.127***
of inter vivos transfers (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Log of stepchild’s income 0.103*** 0.128***
(0.011) (0.013)
Stepchild’s predicted income is below biological children’s income by:
1–49 percent 0.061***
(0.018)
50+ percent 0.037***
(0.014)
N 26,983 26,983 13,904 11,187 11,106
n 13,288 13,288 8,762 7,305 7,268
Note: Figures are marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
N=number of observations; n=number of stepchildren.
a The age reported here refers to the age of the stepchild at the time in which his/her parent
formed a partnership with his/her stepparent (who writes the will). The reference category is
18 years or more.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
45
Table 10: Probability that a Genetic Child is Explicitly Mentioned in His/Her No-contact
or Infrequent-contact Parent’s Will
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Mean of dependent variable 0.428 0.410 0.431 0.431
Frequency of contacts (base=frequent)
Infrequent -0.154*** -0.140*** -0.169*** -0.131**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.045) (0.053)
No contact -0.236*** -0.213*** -0.312*** -0.271***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.037)
Parent is female 0.033*** 0.016* 0.034* 0.031*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018)
Parent age 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Child is female 0.004 0.127*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Child age 0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parent is married 0.021*** -0.002 -0.132*** -0.129***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
Parent married more than once -0.091*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.066***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Parent takes care of child’s children 0.002 -0.007 0.000
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Child is main recipient of inter vivos transfers 0.221*** 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Log of child’s income 0.205*** 0.186*** 0.186***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Child is not spouse’s genetic child -0.084*** -0.065***
(0.015) (0.016)
Child is not spouse’s genetic child × infrequent contacts -0.122***
(0.044)
Child is not spouse’s genetic child × no contacts -0.263***
(0.031)
N 157,173 94,003 39,300 39,300
n 73,522 54,423 26,902 26,902
p-valuea 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0375
Note: Figures are marginal effects and standard errors are in parentheses.
a Refers to the p-value of the test of equality between the coefficients of “Infrequent contacts”
and “No contacts”.
N=number of observations; n=number of children.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Parents Parents
have no contact have contacts Difference
All w. at least with all (b)-(c)
one child children (t-value) N n
A. No will
All 0.446 0.572 0.421 0.152*** 41,075 12,739
(23.282)
Divorced 0.627 0.698 0.602 0.096*** 7,897 2,468
( 7.759)
Widowed 0.391 0.548 0.360 0.188*** 14,384 4,073
(17.377)
B. Will includes all children
All 0.822 0.657 0.849 -0.191*** 19,811 5,734
(24.725)
Divorced 0.820 0.603 0.885 -0.282*** 2,473 657
(16.104)
Widowed 0.832 0.605 0.868 -0.263*** 7,461 2,045
(21.441)
C. Equal intended bequest
All 0.756 0.570 0.786 -0.216*** 19,811 5,734
(24.937)
Divorced 0.742 0.507 0.811 -0.304*** 2,473 657
(15.131)
Widowed 0.751 0.508 0.789 -0.281*** 7,461 2,045
(19.765)
Note: N=number of observations; n=number of individuals. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
All figures are calculated on the core files.
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Table A2: Effect of No Contacts on the Probability that the Will Includes All Children
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate -0.194*** -0.204*** -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.192***
(s.e.) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
N 19,811 15,949 12,460 11,354 10,724
n 6,920 6,365 4,842 4,680 4,470
Mothers Estimate -0.167*** -0.179*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.175***
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
N 16,449 13,116 9,838 8,986 8,572
n 5,418 5,013 3,632 3,529 3,404
Fathers Estimate -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.249***
(s.e.) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.046)
N 3,362 2,833 2,622 2,368 2,152
n 1,503 1,353 1,210 1,151 1,066
Widows and widowers Estimate -0.258*** -0.255*** -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.194***
(s.e.) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
N 7,461 7,401 6,515 6,472 6,221
n 3,075 3,058 2,839 2,825 2,745
Widows Estimate -0.230*** -0.229*** -0.209*** -0.204*** -0.168***
(s.e.) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
N 6,106 6,058 5,303 5,270 5,081
n 2,415 2,400 2,226 2,215 2,157
Widowers Estimate -0.345*** -0.338*** -0.331*** -0.323*** -0.295***
(s.e.) (0.076) (0.076) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087)
N 1,355 1,343 1,212 1,202 1,140
n 661 659 613 610 588
Divorced parents Estimate -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.240*** -0.240*** -0.198***
(s.e.) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
N 2,473 2,441 2,115 2,093 1,856
n 1,012 1,004 899 891 783
Divorced mothers Estimate -0.213*** -0.222*** -0.217*** -0.232*** -0.217***
(s.e.) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
N 1,678 1,661 1,447 1,437 1,313
n 658 655 591 588 533
Divorced fathers Estimate -0.329*** -0.321*** -0.305*** -0.279*** -0.169**
(s.e.) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.073)
N 795 780 668 656 543
n 354 349 308 303 250
Note: See the notes to Tables 3 and 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Effect of No Contacts on the Probability that Parents Intend to Divide their
Estate Equally Among All Children
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All parents Estimate -0.251*** -0.265*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.273***
(s.e.) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
N 19,811 15,949 12,460 11,354 10,724
n 6,920 6,365 4,842 4,680 4,470
Mothers Estimate -0.226*** -0.242*** -0.284*** -0.285*** -0.266***
(s.e.) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
N 16,449 13,116 9,838 8,986 8,572
n 5,418 5,013 3,632 3,529 3,404
Fathers Estimate -0.334*** -0.338*** -0.327*** -0.325*** -0.293***
(s.e.) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
N 3,362 2,833 2,622 2,368 2,152
n 1,503 1,353 1,210 1,151 1,066
Widows and widowers Estimate -0.339*** -0.338*** -0.337*** -0.331*** -0.301***
(s.e.) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
N 7,461 7,401 6,515 6,472 6,221
n 3,075 3,058 2,839 2,825 2,745
Widows Estimate -0.324*** -0.325*** -0.320*** -0.316*** -0.284***
(s.e.) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
N 6,106 6,058 5,303 5,270 5,081
n 2,415 2,400 2,226 2,215 2,157
Widowers Estimate -0.387*** -0.382*** -0.399*** -0.389*** -0.366***
(s.e.) (0.066) (0.066) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
N 1,355 1,343 1,212 1,202 1,140
n 661 659 613 610 588
Divorced parents Estimate -0.331*** -0.333*** -0.320*** -0.326*** -0.312***
(s.e.) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
N 2,473 2,441 2,115 2,093 1,856
n 1,012 1,004 899 891 783
Divorced mothers Estimate -0.312*** -0.321*** -0.309*** -0.333*** -0.342***
(s.e.) (0.054) (0.055) (0.061) (0.062) (0.064)
N 1,678 1,661 1,447 1,437 1,313
n 658 655 591 588 533
Divorced fathers Estimate -0.368*** -0.363*** -0.329*** -0.310*** -0.269***
(s.e.) (0.069) (0.070) (0.074) (0.073) (0.077)
N 795 780 668 656 543
n 354 349 308 303 250
Note: See the notes to Tables 3 and 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Effect of Having Stepchildren and No Contacts on the Probability that Parents
Intend to Divide their Estate Equally Among All Children — Alternative Sample Selection
Specification
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
A. Parents with Stepchildren
All parents Estimate -0.298*** -0.327*** -0.290*** -0.322*** -0.396***
(s.e.) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031)
N 53,105 35,288 33,066 25,207 17,868
n 13,504 11,528 9,255 8,418 5,870
B. No-contact Parents
All parents Estimate -0.212*** -0.229*** -0.260*** -0.259*** -0.236***
(s.e.) (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
N 17,795 14,482 11,483 10,518 9,956
n 6,574 6,003 4,624 4,467 4,281
Note: The estimating sample includes only parents with two or more children and a will
that mentions all of the children. For other explanations, see the notes to Tables 3 and 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Probability that a Male Stepchild is Explicitly Mentioned in His/Her Steppar-
ent’s Will
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Mean of dependent variable 0.261 0.233 0.259 0.259 0.258
Stepparent has own -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.048*** -0.065*** -0.073***
biological children (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024)
Years spent with stepparent 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age at marriage: 0-6a -0.016 -0.016 0.023 0.040 0.047
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.039) (0.040)
Age at marriage: 7-12a -0.000 -0.001 0.040 0.068* 0.073**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035)
Age at marriage: 13-18a -0.016 -0.015 -0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Age of stepchild 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is female 0.003 0.005 0.033** 0.015 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Stepparent age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is in -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.080*** -0.098*** -0.095***
poor/fair health (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Stepparent takes care 0.090*** 0.099** 0.073 0.074
of stepchild’s child(ren) (0.030) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
Stepchild is main recipient 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.160***
of inter vivos transfers (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Log of stepchild’s income 0.095*** 0.131***
(0.015) (0.018)
Stepchild’s predicted income is below biological children’s income by:
1–49 percent 0.103***
(0.036)
50+ percent 0.046**
(0.019)
N 13,598 13,598 6,989 5,616 5,562
n 8,198 8,198 5,001 4,112 4,080
Note: Figures are marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
N=number of observations; n=number of stepchildren.
a The age reported here refers to the age of the stepchild at the time in which his parent for-
med a partnership with his stepparent (who writes the will). The reference category is 18
years or more.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Probability that a Female Stepchild is Explicitly Mentioned in His/Her Step-
parent’s Will
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Mean of dependent variable 0.272 0.245 0.265 0.265 0.265
Stepparent has own -0.028 -0.028 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003
biological children (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Years spent with stepparent 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age at marriage: 0-6a -0.004 -0.003 0.048 0.081* 0.085*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.045) (0.046)
Age at marriage: 7-12a -0.025 -0.024 -0.029 -0.025 -0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028)
Age at marriage: 13-18a 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.009 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
Age of stepchild -0.002** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is female 0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Stepparent age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stepparent is in -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.024 -0.021
poor/fair health (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Stepparent takes care 0.060** 0.062* 0.081* 0.081*
of stepchild’s child(ren) (0.026) (0.037) (0.045) (0.045)
Stepchild is main recipient 0.156*** 0.122*** 0.122***
of inter vivos transfers (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Log of stepchild’s income 0.129*** 0.142***
(0.016) (0.019)
Stepchild’s predicted income is below biological children’s income by:
1–49 percent 0.031
(0.022)
50+ percent 0.019
(0.021)
N 13,385 13,385 6,915 5,571 5,544
n 8,198 8,198 5,082 4,173 4,159
Note: Figures are marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
N=number of observations; n=number of stepchildren.
a The age reported here refers to the age of the stepchild at the time in which her parent for-
med a partnership with her stepparent (who writes the will). The reference category is 18
years or more.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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